

Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2300

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0918

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ATHENS, NICOSIA AS DESIRED

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MASS, PFOR, TU, CY, US

SUBJECT: ORAL MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL TO SECRETARY
KISSINGER

1. FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL RECEIVED ME MID-DAY
FEBRUARY 3 AND ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE SECRETARY THE
FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE:

BEGIN QUOTE: AS YOU ARE AWARE, NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING
CONDUCTED AT TECHNICAL LEVEL ON OUR BILATERAL DEFENSE
RELATIONSHIP. I THINK WE CAN SAY, WITH SOME MARGIN OF
SAFETY THAT ENOUGH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS TO ENABLE US TO HOPE THAT, AT AN EARLY DATE,
WE CAN REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCLUSION ON THIS
SUBJECT. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY FOR WHICH IN MY OPINION, PREVENTS
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE ARTICLE
WHICH DEALS WITH THE DEFENSE SUPPORT TO BE GIVEN BY THE
UNITED STATES TO TURKEY, PARTICULARLY ITS EXTENT AND
NATURE. YOU WILL NO DOUBT REALIZE THAT, TO US, THE
YEARLY LEVEL TO BE PROVIDED AS DEFENSE SUPPORT IS VERY
IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE
MISSION WHICH WE ASSUME WITHIN THE ALLIED DEFENSE.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE LEVEL OF DEFENSE SUPPORT THAT WE HAVE
BEEN OFFERED REFLECTS A STRIKING DISPARITY IN THE BALANCE
OF INTEREST WHICH MUST EXIST IN OUR DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP.

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TO THIS WE CAN ADD DIFFICULTIES TO BE CREATED BY THE

COMPARISON WHICH OUR PUBLIC OPINION WILL UNAVOIDABLY MAKE BETWEEN THE DEFENSE SUPPORT WE RECEIVE AND THAT EXTENDED TO SOME OTHER COUTRIES IN OUR GEOGRAPHICAL REGION.

AT A TIME WHEN WE WERE STRIVING TO OVERCOME EXISTING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SINCERE DETERMINATION OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT, WORD CAME FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT THE FOREIGN RELATIONSS COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE, A FORUM WHICH HAS SO FAR BEEN CONSIDERED AS RELATIVELY MILD VIS-A-VIS TURKEY, COMPLETELY WIPE OUT BOTH THE GRANT AND FMS CREDITS PROPOSED DR THE ADMINISTRATION.

ALTHOUGH I CANNOT CLAIM THAT I POSSESS COMPLETE INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGRESS ON THIS SUBJECT, I CAN, HOWEVER, SAY THAT I AM NOT SO VERY SURE THAT THE MOOD PRESENTLY PREVAILING IN THE CONGRESS IS OF A NATURE TO HELP MAKE OUR PROSPECTIVE MEETING IN WASHINGTON A POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND CONSEQUENTLY I MUST CONFESS THAT I HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS WHETHER OUR MEETING AT THE DATE WE AGREED STILL CONTINUES TO BE OPPORTUNE. MY MAIN CONCERN IS TO AVOID UNDESIRABLE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT CURTAIL OUR RESPECTIVE FLEXIBILITY. SINCE WE BOTH CANNOT AFFORD FAILURE AT THIS STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, I ONCE MORE RELY ON YOUR JUDGMENT WHICH I HAVE ALWAYS ESTEEMED SO AS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION IN THE INTEREST OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. END QUOTE.

2. CAGLAYANGIL THEN SUPPLEMENTED HIS ORAL MESSAGE AT SOME LENGTH CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY ON WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE VERY NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ACTION ON JANUARY 30. HE SAID HE HOPED HE WOULD NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD, THAT HE WANTED HIS VISIT TO BE CARRIED OUT AS SCHEDULED AND HE WANTED TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT HE SAID WHILE ON THE ONE HAND WE ARE TRYING HARD TO SOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES AND TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF A NEW SECURITY AGREEMENT, CONGRESS IS UNDERMINING THOSE EFFORTS. HE SAID IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ONE THING IF CONGRESS HAD MERELY DECIDED TO SET ASIDE A CONSIDERATION OF TURKISH ASSISTANCE
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PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THEY HAD NOT DONE THAT.

3. I SAID THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAD DONE ALMOST EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD SUGGESTED, NAMELY THAT THEY HAD REMOVED FOR THE TIME BEING BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY FROM THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION. CAGLAYANGIL THEN ASKED ABOUT THE SENATE AND I AGREED THAT THE SENATE

COMMITTEE ACTION HAD BEEN GENERALLY NEGATIVE (EXCEPT FOR ALLOWING FMS SALES).

4. CAGLAYANGIL THEN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE WAS A VERY GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT THE SENATE BILL WOULD COLLECT MORE NEGATIVE AMENDMENTS ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE AND HE ASKED IF THAT WERE ACCURATE. I CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE. I ALSO REMINDED HIM, HOWEVER, THAT NO LEGISLATION CAN BE PASSED WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF BOTH HOUSES. I SAID THE HOUSE SCHEDULE WOULD SLOW THE PROGRESS OF THE BILL AND WILL GIVE US TIME TO COMPLETE OUR NEGOTIATIONS IF WE GET ON WITH IT. THEN, I SAID, WE CAN ANNOUNCE TO CONGRESS THAT WE HAVE A NEW DEAL WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THEM DE NOVO. I SAID, IN MY VIEW, IF CAGLAYANGIL WERE TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT, THOSE WHO WANTED TO IMPROVE U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS WOULD BE ABANDONING THE FIELD TO THOSE IN CONGRESS WHOSE PROCLIVITIES WE SAW LAST WEEK.

5. CAGLAYANGIL THEN SAID THAT ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR HIS ORAL MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY WAS THAT IN PAST INSTANCES WHEN EITHER THE HOUSE OR THE SENATE HAD TAKEN SIMILARLY NEGATIVE ACTIONS, EITHER PRESIDENT FORD OR SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD PUBLICLY SPOKEN OUT AGAINST THESE ACTIONS. THIS TIME, HE NOTED, THEY HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING. I SAID THAT IT WAS THE CONTINUING POSITION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY, WHICH THEY HAVE REPEATED MANY TIMES, THAT THEY ARE OPPOSED TO SUCH RESTRICTIONS ON TURKISH ASSISTANCE. THEY HAVE BOTH ALSO STATED THAT THEY WISH TO CONCLUDE A NEW AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY. CAGLAYANGIL ASKED IF THEY HAD SAID THIS RECENTLY. I SAID THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN, ENUNCIATING THE POLICY OF THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT, HAD YESTERDAY SAID JUST THIS TO AMBASSADOR ESENBEL. (PROMPT RECEIPT OF STATE 25551 WAS MOST HELPFUL HERE AND I QUOTED DIRECTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM IT. I ALSO USED HARTMAN'S WORDS ALMOST VERBATIM IN STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS ON CYPRUS.)

6. CAGLAYANGIL THEN AFFIRMED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN THE CONTINUATION OF U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TURKEY. HE SAID HE WAS NOT THINKING OF TOMORROW MORNING'S HEADLINES, BUT WAS THINKING OF THE FUTURE OF HIS CHILDREN AND HIS GRANDCHILDREN. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT IF HE WENT TO WASHINGTON AND RETURNED WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT, THE SITUATION WOULD BE WORSE THAN IT IS NOW. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE PARTY TO ANY ACTION THAT WOULD RENDER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO THE "AMERICAN OPTION".

7. I RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WOULD BE DOING IF HE DID NOT GO TO WASHINGTON. I SAID OUR CONGRESS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 0918

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WOULD THEN GO AHEAD WITH NO ALTERNATIVE, I.E., OUR AGREE-
MENT, BEFORE IT. IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, I POINTED OUT,
TO GET THIS AGREEMENT SETTLED BEFORE CONGRESS DEVELOPED TOO
MUCH MOMENTUM IN AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION. WHILE HIS VISIT
TO WASHINGTON WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN THIS REGARD,
IT WOULD ALSO SERVE AN IMPORTANT DISCIPLINARY PURPOSE FOR
BOTH GOVERNMENTS, IN THAT IT WOULD TEND TO FORCE BOTH UNDER
THREAT OF THIS DEADLINE TO FACE AND RESOLVE THE MANY
DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH WOULD (IF PAST HISTORY WAS ANY GUIDE)
OTHERWISE LIKELY BE LEFT TO DRAG ON INTERMINABLY.

8. AT THIS POINT CAGLAYANGIL HAD TO LEAVE BECAUSE OF AN
APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. BEFORE DOING SO,
HOWEVER, I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO HIM ABOUT
(A) THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. MEETING TURKEY'S UNREALISTIC
ASSISTANCE FIGURE REQUEST, (B) THE NECESSITY FOR AGREEMENT ON
NATO/SOFA EXTENSION AND TAX RELIEF, AND (C) THE FURTHER
NECESSITY OF HAVING THE INSTALLATIONS RECOMMENCE OPERATIONS
UPON THE SIGNATURE OF OUR AGREEMENT.

9. AS OUR CONVERSATION CONCLUDED CAGLAYANGIL TURNED BACK TO
HIS ORAL MESSAGE. "I DIDN'T SAY TO SECRETARY KISSINGER I
WOULD NOT COME," HE EMPHASIZED, "ONLY THAT I WANTED HIS
ADVICE AS TO WHETHER UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I SHOULD
COME". AS HE WAS GOING OUT THE DOOR, HE ADDED,
THAT THE SECRETARY'S RESPONSE BE SENT TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

10. COMMENT: DESPITE THE SLIGHTLY AFFIRMATIVE IMPLICATION

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OF CAGLAYANGIL'S LAST REMARKS, I THINK HE AND DEMIREL ARE GETTING COLD FEET AND ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE WASHINGTON VISIT. THE COLD FEET RELATE BOTH TO THEIR PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS HERE AND ALSO POSSIBLY TO A RELUCTANCE TO FACE UP TO SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS THEY MUST MAKE TO BRING THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION WITHIN THE RANGE OF WHAT WE CAN ACCEPT.

11. THERE OBVIOUSLY IS A RISK IN CAGLAYANGIL'S PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE, AS WE CANN'T NOW BE SURE THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING. EVEN IF WE FAIL TO GET AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WE CAN STILL EMPHASIZE PUBLICLY HOW MUCH WE NARROWED OUR DIFFERENCES. WHILE THIS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ALTOGETHER ELIMINATE THE RISKS OF A NON-AGREEMENT VISIT, THE DAMAGE IS, I THINK, LESS THAN WHAT WE WILL INCUR IF HE POSTPONES. THE SECRETARY WILL HAVE LOST AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS AGAIN PERSONALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTION ON THE CYPRUS FRONT. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, WE WILL HAVE LOST THE MOMENTUM WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT UP NOW IN THE EFFORT TO REACH A NEW SECURITY AGREEMENT, AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE MUST HAVE SOON TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION OF OUR PARALYZED BASES HERE AND IN THE CONGRESS AT HOME. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY URGE CAGLAYANGIL TO ADHERE TO HIS VISIT AS SCHEDULED.
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